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l INTRODUCTION
For anyone trained in the private law tradition, there is at first sight no con-
nection between private law claims and human rights. However, appear-
ances can be deceptive. As the Dutch professor of law J.L.M. Eiders notes:
The raising of the subject of the relationship between private law and fundamental rights
is based on the fairly generally accepted view that the two areas of law are more or less
unrelated and perhaps also on the observation that a certain tension can exist between
civil rights and fundamental rights. (...) It is, however, incorrect to juxtapose private law
and fundamental rights solely on the basis of an alleged contrast between them. If we
examine the essence of a number of typical civil rights, we find rights or principles of law
which have either been 'positivised' äs fundamental rights or are protected äs
fundamental rights.1
This observation will be true of many fundamental rights. But is it also true
of Article l Protocol No. l? In this contribution we first examine the Protocol
in the context of the Dutch concept of ownership (§ 2) and then deal with the
role of Article l for private law in general, in terms of its effect first of all
between individuals and, second, between individuals and the State (section
3). We then go on to consider the importance of Article l at a more practical
level. The national literature suggests that the Protocol does impose limits,
in particular in respect of the restrictions imposed by the State in the law on
damages. We will examine mandatory participation in settlement funds,
statutory limitation of liability and the concept of periods of prescription
within which individuals must enforce their rights (§ 4). This contribution
ends with a brief conclusion (§ 5).
Dr. H.D. Ploeger is Lecturer in Civil and Notary Law, Leiden University; Prof. dr. C.J.J.M.
Stoiker is Dkector of the E.M. Meijers Institute of Legal Studies, Leiden University. The
authors are grateful to Prof. E.A. Alkema of Leiden University and Prof. J. Spier, Attorney
General at the Dutch Supreme Court for their very helpful comments.
J.L.M. Eiders, Pnvaatrechi en grondrechten, Consultative Report for the Private Law
Association, Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande 1986.
70 H.D. Ploeger & C.J.J.M. Stoiker
2 ARTICLE l PROTOCOL No. l ECHR AND THE DUTCH CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
2.1 Ownership in the Civil Code
Private law practitioners who are concerned with the issue of the protection
of possessions under human rights law must above all realise that the
concept of 'eigendom' [ownership] äs used in the Dutch translation of Article
l Protocol No. l - 'ledere natuurlijke of rechtspersoon heefl recht op het ongestoord
genot van zijn eigendom' [Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions] - is by no means limited to the tech-
nical concept of ownership äs used in the domestic law of the Netherlands.
In accordance with Roman law and in Imitation of the French Code Civil
of 1804 the old Civil Code introduced in the Netherlands in 1838 was based
on the premise that there can be ownership of both corporeal objects and
patrimonial rights (incorporeal objects). However, the private law concept of
ownership in the new Civil Code that has been in force since l January 1992
is much narrower. Section l of Book 5 of the Civil Code reads äs follows :2
Ownership is the most comprehensive right which a person can have in a thing ('zaak').
To the exclusion of everybody eise, the owner is free to use the thing, provided that his
use is not in violation of the rights of others and that it respects the limitations based
uponstatutory rules and rules of unwrittenlaw. (...)
As a result of the influence of its author Professor E.M. Meijers of Leiden
University (1885-1954), the concept of ownership is reserved for the most
comprehensive right to 'things'. A zaak [thing] is defined in Section 2 of Book
3 of the Civil Code äs follows: "Things are corporeal objects susceptible of
human control'. It follows that there can no longer be said to be ownership
of patrimonial rights. At rnost such rights 'belong to' a person or a person is
'entitled to' them.
What were previously termed 'incorporeal objects' are now designated
äs Vermögensrechten [patrimonial rights]. See the definition in Section 6 of
Book 3 of the Civü Code:
Patrimonial rights are those which, either separately or together with another right, are
transferable; rights which are intended to procure a material benefit to their holder; or
rights which have been acquired in exchange for actual or expected material benefit.
They may therefore be encumbrances on a thing (for example the usufruct of
a house), rights of action under a contract or the law (for example, a claim to
damages in tort) or encumbrances on patrimonial rights (e.g. a pledge of a
right of action).
2 Translation taken from P.P.C. Haanappel and Ejan Mackaay, New Netherlands Civil Code,
Patrimonial Law, Deventer: Kluwer 1990.
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Things and patrimonial rights are together designated by the umbrella
term goed [property]. See Section l of Book 3 of the Civil Code.
Property is comprised of all things and of all patrimonial rights.
2.2 Tossessions' within the meaning of Article l Protocol No. l ECHR
Article l Protocol No. l ECHR protects not only the right of ownership of
things. This is evident from the French and English texts which refer to
'biens' and 'possessions' respectively. This broader scope even surpasses the
defirütions under national law, äs is apparent from the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights itself:3
The Court recalls that the notion of 'possessions' (in French 'biens') in Article l Protocol
No. l has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of
physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded
äs 'property rights', and thus 'possessions', for the purposes of this provision.
The Dutch translation of Article l Protocol No. l ECHR, which refers in brief
to ownership (eigendom), is therefore misleading. The protection of the ECHR
comprises more than ownership in the technical private law sense of Section
l, Book 5, of the Civil Code äs referred to above.
To what extent does the protection of the ECHR therefore extend? The
precise scope of its application has not yet crystallised, but from the private
law perspective we see no reason for a limitation. In our view, the terms
'possessions' and 'biens' used in the Protocol can, in principle, cover all
private law claims which come under the definition of goed [property] in
Section l of Book 3 of the Civil Code. This means that protection is afforded
not only to the right of ownership äs the most comprehensive right to
corporeal objects (things) but also to all patrimonial rights. Examples are the
rights that flow from contract, for example the right to delivery of a thing
purchased under a contract of sale and purchase.
This view finds Support in a recent judgment of a Dutch court.5 The case
concerned what are known äs 'manure production rights', which entitle pig
breeders to have a given number of pigs. The court was required to assess
whether the rights granted by the State to Dutch pig breeders were pro-
tected by the Protocol. It answered the question in the affirmative:
3 For a more detailed account see the contribution by Hartlief in this volume.
4 ECrtHR 23 February 1995 (Casus Dosier- und Fördertechnik/The Netherlands), Series A vol.
306-B,§53.
5 RB Den Haag 23 December 1998, (Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders and others/State
of the Netherlands), NjCM-Bulletin 1999, p. 494-511, wifh note by T. Barkhuysen and M.L. van
Emmerik; Hof Den Haag 20 January 2000,18; ]B 2000, no. 59, annotated by F. Vernimmen-de
Jong, also published in NJ-KORT 2000,18.
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The (autonomous) concept of 'possessions' in Article l Protocol No. l to the ECHR covers
rights which may be regarded äs patrimonial assets. The available, unencumbered
manure production rights (...) are patrimonial assets. These rights may, after all, be
transferred to other farm businesses and have a value on the open market. After they
have been converted into pig and breeding sow rights, they remain (to a limited extent)
marketable in so far äs they have not been rounded. (...)
The fact that the manure production rights were not intended by the authorities to create
patrimonial rights does not mean that they have not become patrimonial assets (...).
Even if they are merely temporary rights, this does not detract from their nature äs
patrimonial assets (...). It may, however, influence their value.
Although the pig rights were described in the judgment äs vermogensbestand-
delen [patrimonial assets] - a term urtknown to the Dutch Civil Code itself -
it can be inferred from the test by reference to the criteria of 'value in econ-
omic circulation' and 'marketability' that the court regards the production
right of a pig farmer äs a patrimonial right within the meaning of Section 6,
Book 3, of the Civil Code. It thus comes within the definition of 'possession'
in Article l.6
2.3 When does a right of action exist?
We mentioned above that we would, in principle, classify all Claims that
come within the definition of 'property' under the Dutch Civil Code äs
'possessions'. We have added the qualification 'in principle' because there is
an important point in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
which could easily be overlooked, but which plays a role in particular in
relation to rights of action.
It is assumed that there must be a concrete and sufficiently specified
right if it is to qualify äs a 'possession' within the meaning of the Protocol. It
follows that a contractual right to remuneration for Services rendered is a
possession, whereas an expectation based on existing legislation that ser-
vices to be rendered in the future will be remunerated in a given way is not.7
The latter is no more than an expectation: there is no claim against a specific
debtor.8
Reference should also be made to the judgment in the well-known
Marckx case, in which the European Court of Human Rights held that the
disadvantaged position of an illegitimate child under the Belgian law of
succession is contrary to Article l Protocol No. l, and Article 14. The right
The court then concluded that the limitation of these rights constituted a 'deprivation' within
the meaning of Article 1. The correctness of this conclusion has given rise to an exchange of
views in the Dutch literature.
EComHR l April 1974 (X/Germany), Yearbook ECHR 1974, p. 148.
On this point see the contribution by Hartlief in this volume.
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that has been violated here is not that of the child itself äs heir. The violated
right is that of the child's mother, Paula Marckx, to dispose of her own
property, in the sense that under Belgian legislation it is impossible for her
to leave her property fully to her child.9 It is indeed true that äs long äs the
succession has not taken effect the child has no more than an expectation of
succeeding to the property of the testatrix.10
One may also wonder whether there can be said to be a 'possession' in
the case of a right of action the existence of which has not been categorically
established between the parties and about which the court has not yet
expressed an opinion. A classic example from the textbooks is the case of a
road accident caused by a hit-and-run driver. Although the offender must
still be traced, the victim has a right to damages in tort. This right of action
arises äs a result of the offence itself.
Suppose for a moment that the offender has been caught, but denies his
liability. This does not change the existence of the right of action. The
judgment of the court in which liability is determined is declaratory, not
constiturive. The court simply declares in its judgment what the law is. Such
rights of action are therefore regarded under Dutch law äs a patrimonial
right, provided that the right of action is sufficiently specific. The right of
action may, for example, be assigned even if it is disputed and even, indeed,
if the debtor is still unknown.
It might actually be argued that in this respect the European Court of
Human Rights imposes a stricter criterion than the national legislature. In
the 1994 case of Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis the European
Court, in assessing whether rights of action held to be null and void by the
Greek authorities could be regarded äs a possession, emphatically stated
that the arbitration award in which these rights of action were granted was
final and binding between the parties:
In order to determine whether the applicants had a 'possession' for the purposes of
Article l Protocol No. l, the Court must ascertain whether judgment no. 13910/79 of the
Athens Court of First Instance and the arbitration award had given rise to a debt in their
favour that was sufficiently established to be enforceable. (...)
The Court agrees with the Government that it is not its task to approve or disapprove the
substance of that award. It is, however, under a duty to take note of the legal position
established by that decision in relation to the parties. According to its wording, the
award was final and binding; it did not require any further enforcement measure and no
ordinary or special appeal lay against it (...) At the moment when Law no. 1701/1987 was
9 ECrtHR 13 June 1979 (Marckx/Belgium), Senes A vol. 31, § 65.
10 ECrtHR 13 June 1979 (Marckx/Belgium), Senes A vol. 31, § 50: "The Court in fact excludes
Article l of Protocol No. 1: like the Commission and the Government, it notes that this
Article does no more than enshrine the right of everyone to the peaceful enjoyment of 'his'
possessions, that consequently it applies only to a person's existing possessions and that it
does not guarantee the right to acquire possessions whether on intestacy or through volun-
tary dispositions.'
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passed the arbitration award of 27 February 1984 therefore conferred on the applicants a
right in the sums awarded. Admittedly, that right was revocable, since the award could
still be annulled, but the ordinary courts had by then already twice held - at fürst instance
and on appeal - that there was no ground for such annuknent. Accordingly, in the
Court's view, that right constituted a 'possession' within the meaning of Article l Proto-
colNo. 1."
The case of National & Provincial Building Society three years later is less
clear in this respect. Here the European Court did not express an opinion on
the correctness of the applicant's Submission that despite the absence of 'an
enforceable final judgment' there could still be a 'possession' within the
meaning of Article l if there was a 'clear legitimate expectation' based on a
favourable judgment in a comparable case." This concerned an unproven
claim for restitution of excess tax. The basis of the right of action was the
invalidity of the transitional legislation under which the tax had been
collected. This invalidity had been established in an earlier case instituted by
a party (Woolwich) which was in a position comparable to that of the
applicants. The British authorities subsequently introduced amending
legislation to close the gap with retroactive effect. The applicants submitted
that this constituted a violation of Article 1. The European Court did not
deal with the question of whether there was a possession in this case, since it
assessed the case by reference to Article 1:
on the working assumption that in the light of the Woolwich 2 ruling the applicant
societies did have possessions in the form of vested rights to restitution which they
sought to exercise in direct and indirect ways in the various proceedings instituted in
1991 and 1992.13
As it ultimately transpired that there had been no violation of Article l, the
European Court did not need to consider the question of whether a claim is
indeed a possession within the meaning of the Article and therefore dis-
regarded it.
As regards liability in tort, the European Court took a much broader
position in the 1995 judgment in the case of Pressos Compania Naviera." In
this case the Belgian Government had restricted liability for the errors of its
pilots to cases of intent or gross negligence and had directed that this should
be retrospective for no less than thirty years. This legislation was a reaction
to a judgment of the Court de Cassation in 1983 in which it held that, notwith-
standing the previous Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Belgian
Civil Code, a pilot could be liable for the damage caused by bis errors.
11 ECrtHR 9 December 1994 (Stran Greek Refineries and Straüs Andreadis/Greece), Series A vol.
301-B,§ 59,61-62.
12 ECrtHR 23 October 1997 (National & Provincial Building Society/UK), Rf&D 1997- VE, no. 55,
p. 2325.
13 §70.
14 ECrtHR 20 November 1995 (Pressos Compania Naviera/Belgium), Series A vol. 332.
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The question before the European Court was whether the Belgian
authorities had violated Article l by depriving the applicants of the right to
damages. The European Court answered in the affirmative the question of
whether these Claims could be treated äs a possession within the meaning of
Article l, in any event in respect of cases of damage which occurred before
the introduction of the limiting legislation:
In Order to determine whether in this instance there was a 'possession', the Court may
have regard to the domestic law in force at the time of the alleged interference, äs there is
nothing to suggest that that law ran counter to the object and purpose of Article l
Protocol No. 1.
The rules in question are rules of tort, under which Claims for compensation come into
existence äs soon äs the damage occurs.
A claim of this nature 'constituted an asset' and therefore amounted to 'a possession
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1. This provision was accordingly
applicable in the present case' (see, mutatis mutandis, Van Marie and Others v. the
Netherlands, judgment of 26 June 1986, Senes A no. 101, p. 13, § 41).
On the basis of the judgments of the Court of Cassation of 5 November 1920, 15
December 1983 and 17 May 1985 (see § 17 above), the applicants could argue that they
had a legitimate expectation' that their claims deriving from the accidents in question
would be determined in accordance with the general law of tort.
For Article l to be applicable it is therefore sufficient that there is an act or
complex of acts that can be described äs tortious. A claim arises at this
juncture. Questions about the causal connection between act and damage,
the imputability of the act to the perpetrator and whether the existence of a
groiind of justification deprives the act of its unlawful nature16 need not
already have been answered by the domestic courts in order to be able to
invoke the protection of Article 1.
3 THE IMPORTANCE OFTHE PROTOCOLTOCIVIL LAW
3.1 Between individuals
What role does the protection of possessions in the ECHR play in private law
relationships? In day-to-day practice this role seems to be limited. National
case law on Article l is in any event sparse. Unlike Article 6 (right to a fair
hearing) and Article 8 (right to family life), Article l has not yet really
become a commonly cited provision in private law proceedings in the
Netherlands. Only sporadically do parties invoke the protection afforded by
the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions in the ECHR. Nor do we
expect things to be much different in the future.
15 §31.
16 For these requirements under Dutch law see Section 162, Book 6, Civil Code.
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The limited role of Article l in daily practice can be explained by the
nature of civil law itself. It relates primarily to the rights and duties of
individuals in their dealings with one another. Invoking a fundamental right
of ownership in a dispute between two private individuals would be fairly
pointless. Even if one takes the view - like Eiders, who was quoted in the
introduction - that this fundamental right provides the foundation for the
protection of the individual against violation of his rights äs laid down in
practice in the rules of private law, one must still acknowledge that in a
private law dispute between individuals this fundamental right does not
provide any criteria by reference to which it is possible to determine
whether there has indeed been a violation of this kind.
This may be illustrated by an example drawn from the case law of the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands.17 The owner of a plot of land converts it
into a rubbish dump. The owner of an adjoining cherry orchard sees that the
birds attracted by the rubbish dump have soon consumed the cherries on his
trees. He claims compensation from his neighbour for the damage suffered.
The owner of the orchard can naturally base his right to compensation on
the violation of his fundamental right to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possession. But invoking the ECHR would not provide him with any extra
arguments in the proceedings. The question whether there has been an
unlawful violation of the enjoyment of the possession is and remains a
question that must be answered by reference to private law criteria and the
private law definition of these criteria. Whether the actions of the neighbour
mean that he is liable to pay compensation to the owner of the orchard has
to be answered by reference to the criterion of due care äs contained in the
Civil Code.
3.2 Between individuals and the State
The ECHR does, however, become relevant when it is the State which violates
the enjoyment of private law rights of the individual. This is the function of
human rights in the most classical sense: protection of the individual against
an authority which limits his rights or even deprives him entirely of his
rights. Such cases involve, first of all, direct violations such äs expropriation,
destruction or the imposition of limitations.
An example of the application of Article l Protocol No. l ECHR by the
Dutch domestic courts is the ruling on 'Het witte paard'. A chess club rented
premises for its activities, but lost the enjoyment of the premises äs a result
of the expropriation of the building in which the club met. Section 42,
17 HR10 March 1972, NJ1972,278 0/ermeulen/Lekkerkerker).
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subsection 2, of the Dutch Expropriation Act provides that the cornpensation
payable to the tenant of non-commercial premises is twice the annual rent.
The club would therefore have been entitled to cornpensation of NLG 27,630
(€ 12,537), whereas it could show that the actual damage was many times
this sum, namely NLG 116,500 (€ 52,865).
Here the ECHR comes to the assistance of the tenant. The Supreme Court
of the Netherlands held, first of all, that the tenant could derive the same
protection äs an owner from the Protocol. The tenancy was therefore
deemed to be a 'possession' within the rneaning of this Article. The Supreme
Court went on to hold that the deprivation of this right in exchange for the
above-mentioned liquidated damages was not in reasonable proportion to
the value of the right. This constituted a violation of the Protocol, unless the
rule was based on 'legitimate objectives of public interesf. Since this was not
case, Article l Protocol No. l had been violated.
The case is a good example of a direct violation by the State of the right
of an individual against which Article l Protocol No. l affords protection.
Although the national legislature had precisely defined the extent of the
cornpensation owed, the Supreme Court held that this cornpensation was
incompatible with Article 1. Similar examples can be found in Drupsteen's
contribution in this volume.
Another violation can occur if the State provides insufficient guarantees
for the peaceful enjoyment of rights by individuals, albeit not on this
occasion in the relationship between individuals and the State but in the
private law relationship between individuals. Let us now go back to the
example of the rubbish dump and the cherry-eating birds given in section
3.1. The State would violate the right of the owner of the cherry orchard to
peaceful enjoyment of his possession if it were to stipulate by law that
owners of rubbish dumps may never be held liable for nuisance caused to
the surrounding area by the presence of the rubbish dump.
Such an interference is naturally also conceivable in purely contractual
relationships. The European Court of Human Righls has indeed held that
the Protocol is applicable to interference by the State in the enjoyment of
rights resulting from transactions between private individuals:
Admittedly, the State may be responsible under Article l for interferences with peaceful
enjoyment of possessions resulting from transactions between private individuals.
An interference of this kind may well occur more often than one might sup-
pose. An example is the recent Dutch legislarion on solving overindebted-
ness for natural persons. Similar legislation exists in other European
countries and in the United States of America. What does it involve? Before
18 ECrtHR 25 April 1996 (Gustafsson/Sweden), RJ&D 1996-Π, no. 9, p. 637 ff, § 60. With reference
to ECrtHR 21 February 1986 (James and others/υκ), Senes A vol. 98, § 35-36.
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the Wet Schuldsanering Natuurlijke Personen13 (WSNP) [Natural Persons Debt
Settlement Act] entered into effect in late 1998 debtors were dependent upon
the co-operation of their creditors for a solution to their debt bürden. If
creditors did not agree to a repayment scheme, the debtor could be harried
for many years, for example by means of attachment of earnings or threats
of foreclosure on his home. In other words, although the creditor was in
many cases unable de facto to recover his claim owing to the insolvency of
his debtor, he retained his right of action de jure. In order to provide debtors
with a definite way out of their difficulties ('a fresh Start'), the Natural
Persons Debt Settlement Act was introduced äs a Supplement to the existing
possibility for individuals to petition for bankruptcy.20 The provisions of the
Act have been included in the existing Dutch Bankruptcy Act (section 284 et
seq.).
If creditors do not agree to an amicable settlement a debtor may now
apply to the courts for an arrangement. In general such an arrangement will
last three years. After its expiry, the remaining debt is converted into a
natural Obligation.21 This means that although the debt continues to exist, it
can no longer be claimed. In other words, the creditors can ultimately lose
their right of action äs a result of a voluntary arrangement.22 Such legislation
therefore constitutes, in principle, an 'interference with the peaceful enjoy-
ment of possessions'.
4 ARTICLE l AND THE LAW OF TORTS AND COMPENSATION
4.1 General
In the previous sections we have examined the question of when there is
possession within the meaning of Article 1. We have also seen that in the
context of civil law relationships the Article mainly derives its significance
from the protection which it affords against action by the State to limit the
enjoyment by individuals of their rights under civil law.
We will examine this importance in a more practical way by reference to a
number of examples taken from the law of compensation. It is, however,
19 Stb. 1998, no. 245.
20 Lower House of Parliament 1992-1993,22 969, p. 6 (explanatory notes)
21 Section 358, subsection l, Bankruptcy Act: 'the claim in respect of which the debt resched-
uling arrangement takes effect is, in so far äs it has not been met, no longer enforceable,
irrespective of whether or not the claim has been proved'.
22 A study of the actual Operation of the Act is being made at the E.M, Meijers Institute of Legal
Studies in Leiden by Ms. Nadja Jungmann.
In search ofthe importance ofArticle l Protocol No 1. ECHR to private law 79
worthwhile first examining the application of Article l in general. Article l
can be split into three rules. However in accordance with the established
case law of the European Court these rules must be viewed in their entirety.
The first sentence of the first paragraph contains the general principle of
'peaceful enjoyment'. The second sentence concerns the conditions under
which 'deprivation' can take place. Finally, § 2 recognises the right of a State
to 'control the use of property'. In the case of deprivation of possession in
the public interest it is provided that the conditions provided for by law
must be observed. In ruling on the lawfulness of a measure the European
Court will tend to follow the view taken by the national courts.
Regarding the lawfulness of the impugned measures, the Court would recall that its power
to review compliance with the domestic law is limited.23
It has proved difficult to draw a line between 'deprivation' and 'control of
use'.24 This seems to depend to a great extent on the facts äs a whole.25
'Deprivation' does not in any event exist if the property has not been
completely taken26/ or if the measure is only provisional.27
Finally, we would return to the first sentence of the first paragraph. This
is more important than it seems at first sight. If the Situation is not covered
by 'deprivation' or 'control of use' the assessment will take place by
reference to the general principle of the first sentence of Article l.28
A central feature of the criterion in Article l is the need for 'a fair balance
between the demands of the general interest of the Community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights'. This
runs through the entire Article, no matter which of the three above-
mentioned rules is applicable to the case in question. See, for example, the
European Court of Human Rights in. James and Others:
23 ECrtHR 21 Februaiy 1990 (Häkansson and Sturesson/Sweden), Series A vol. 171-A, § 47.
24 See D. Andersen, 'Compensation for Interference with Property', European Human Rights Law
Review 1999, p. 553-554.
25 See for example ECrtHR 25 October 1986 (Agosi/υκ), Series A vol. 108, § 51.
26 See for example ECrtHR 19 December 1989 (Mellacher and others/ Austria), Series A vol. 169, §
44; ECrtHR 29 November 1991 (Pine Vally Developments/UK), Series A vol. 222, § 56 ('title
remained vested in Healy Holdings, whose powers to take decisions concerning the
property were unaffected (...) the land was not left without any meaningful alternative use');
ECrtHR 28 July 1999 (Immobiliare Saffi/Italia), Appl. No. 22774/93, § 46 ('the applicant
Company was at no stage deprived of the right to let or to seil the property7). Deprivation
did, however, occur in: ECrtHR 28 October 1999 (Brumarescu/Romania), Appl. No. 28342/95,
§ 77 (the applicant 'was no longer able to seil, devise, donate or otherwise dispose of the
property7).
27 See, for example: ECrtHR 7 December 1976 (Handyside/UK), Series A vol. 24, § 62; ECrtHR 22
February 1994 (Raimondo/Italy), Series A vol. 281-A, § 29; ECrtHR 15 November 1996
(Prötsch/Austria), R/6ü 1996-V, no. 22, p. 1812, § 42.
28 ECrtHR 9 December 1994 (Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis/UK), Series A vol. 301-
B, § 68.
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Not only must a measure depriving a person of bis property pursue, on the facts äs well
äs in principle, a legitimate aim 'in the public interest', but there must also be a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.
A lack of proportionality would, for example, occur in the case of
expropriation if a person is deprived of a right without payment of a
reasonable sum corresponding to the value thereof. Article l does not,
however, confer automatic entitlement to füll compensation:
(...) the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value
would normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered
justifiable under Article 1. Article l does not, however guarantee a right to füll compensation
in all circumstances. Legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such äs pursued in measures of
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social jusü'ce, may call for less than
reimbursement of the füll market value.
This concludes our brief remarks on the rules of Article 1. We will now
apply them to three situations.
4.2 Mandatory participation in mass tort settlement funds
In recent years the phenomenon of mass injury has attracted attention. This
concerns cases of large-scale injury often affecting a large group of injured
parties and sometimes also involving a large group of potentially liable
persons. The subject of mass injury gives rise to a problem to which
traditional liability law - which is based on one-to-one relationships - seems
unable to respond sufficiently.
For example, it may be impossible to recover compensation because the
link between the act and the injury is too difficult to prove or because the
party who is liable, for example the producer of a harmful medicine, is
insolvent or can no longer be traced. Settlement of damage in accordance
with the traditional law of liability can take a very long time having regard
to the large number of people involved both on the side of the victims and
on the side of the perpetrators.
A mass settlement compensation fund is a solution to these problems.
Attention is focused in particular on what are known äs 'limitation funds'.
This description is not entirely accurate. It is not a limitation of liability, but
a determination of the amount of compensation to be paid. The victims can
claim fixed amounts of compensation from this fund. In this way they can
circumvent the difficulties posed by the law of liability.
29 ECrtHR 21 February 1986 Games and others/UK), Series A vol. 98, § 54.
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One method is that the extent of the compensation is made dependent
on the 'hardness' of the claim. For example, when the so-called Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust was established to cover the damage suffered by women
who had used this contraceptive, provision was made for three levels of
compensation: (i) a fixed amount of $ 725, payable after the claimant had
made a declaration 'under penalty of law' that the Dalkon shield had been
used and had caused injury; (ii) an amount of between $ 850 and $ 5,500
depending on the nature and seriousness of the injury, for which purpose a
medical report was necessary; and (iii) a large amount of compensation (on
average $ 45,000) if a causal link could acrually be proved between the injury
and the use of the Dalkon shield.30
The advantage of a compensation fund to the liable parties (such äs the
employer or the producer) is that they are liberated from further Claims in
exchange for providing the fund from which the compensation is paid. A
compensation fund is also advantageous for victims whose claims are
'problematic' (for example, a claim where the causal link is difficult to
prove). They receive a given amount of compensation in cases where they
would have otherwise have had virtually no chance under the traditional
law of liability. An example is cases involving infection with HIV.
A group who are worse off in the case of a compensation fund are the
victims who have a 'hard' claim against a creditworthy defendant in cases
where the actual loss or injury exceeds the fixed sum paid by the fund. Does
mandatory participation in such fund and the consequent deprivation of the
possibility of obtaining füll compensation through the courts constitute an
impermissible violation of the right of the injured party to 'the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions'? This seems to be a real issue. In the debate on
the scope for the establishment of funds, the ECHR is indeed mentioned äs a
potentially formidable obstacle.
As regards the question of whether the establishment of funds is
permissible, much wül depend on whether the limitation of the claim to
compensation can pass the test of proportionality. What is at issue is
whether, in the case of (mandatory) participation in a fund, there is a
reasonable balance between the objectives of the public interest and the
violation of the rights of the individual victim. What is the result of this test?
It would be hard to deny that the establishment of a fund serves the public
interest in so far äs victims can have their damage determined in a speedy
and not exceptionally complicated manner and have the prospect of
compensation of this damage. A feature of cases of mass injury is the
generally large number of victims who find themselves in a comparable
30 Source: L. Dommering-Van Rongen, Schade vergoeden door Fondsvorming, Deventer: Kluwer
1996.
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position, the comparatively small number of persons or institutions to be
held liable and the many intractable questions concerning liability and
causation. In addition, the type of injury often means that victims have an
extra interest in obtaining a quick and Overall settlement since they rnight
not survive a protracted legal action. Personal injury äs a result of working
with asbestos is a good example. Although the counterargument might be
that participation in the fund could also be arranged on a voluntary basis
(i.e. without the mandatory participation described above), this would entail
a problem for the liable parties in that the 'hard' cases could recover their
damage under the ordinary law of liability and that the fund would serve,
above all, the interests of those who have a weaker case under private law.
The establishment of a fund on the basis of voluntary participation will
therefore prove difficult if only for practical reasons.
In summary, the mandatory establishment of a compensation fund may
be seen äs a legal structure conducive to the public interest. As against this, a
victim who is obliged to resort to a fund will often obtain less compensation
than he would if he were to pursue his rights before the civil courts. What is
the result of the test? We would merely state that mandatory participation in
a compensation fund, in any event in situations of mass injury, need not
conflict with Article l Protocol No. 1. Whether the institution of a
mandatory compensation fund is acceptable in a specific case will depend
on the conditions controlling which victims can participate and the amount
of compensation which they can hope to obtain, äs weighed against the
interest of a relatively speedy settlement of the case; the greater the
restrictions on access to the fund, the more likely it is that this will constitute
a violation of the Protocol. In America courts play an inportant role in
devising procedures and remedies to preserve the essence of equal access to
the court System and to provide effective remedies for the injured of mass
tort. The inclusion of an opt-out clause can easily preclude incertainties
about whether or not the ECHR-test is passed.31
The issue of accessibility in connection with the settlement of Claims by
means of the establishment of compensation funds has recently become of
particular importance in the Netherlands: both in the case of the Claims by
'DES' daughters and in the case of haemophiliacs infected by HTV far-
reaching agreements for collective settlement have been concluded by the
representatives of the liable parties (pharmaceutical companies and blood
banks respectively) and representatives of the victims. However, the details
are not yet known.
31 See J.B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation - The effect of Class Actions,
Consolidation and other Multiparty Devices, Evanston Illinois: North Western University
Press 1995.
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Article 6 ECHR also plays a role in this connection. The cases of Bellet and
F.E. are a warning to proceed cautiously. Both cases concerned the French
fund established to compensate victims infected with the HIV virus after a
blood transfusion. The establishment of the fund was not intended
completely to exclude access to the courts. However, access to the courts
was limited in the sense that only those persons who rejected the offer of the
fund, which was intended äs füll compensation for the damage suffered,
could take proceedings. A special appeal procedure to the Court of Appeal
in Paris was instituted for this purpose.
Bellet obtained compensation from the fund and then applied to the
French Court of Appeal in order to obtain compensation in addition to the
sum received from the fund. However, his claim was held to be
inadmissible. He then appealed to the European Court in Strasbourg, which
proved amenable to his claim. According to the European Court, Bellet was
entitled to assume, on the basis of the parliamentary history of the
legislation, that even after the award of an amount from the fund there
would still be the possibility of obtaining an additional sum - in so far äs the
amount awarded by the compensation fund did not cover his damage - by
taking proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal.32
F.E. had bet on two horses. After obtaining compensation from the com-
pensation fund he continued his legal action before the courts. The Cour de
Cassation held, however, that the law did not permit a person to obtain ad-
ditional compensation through the ordinary courts after accepting the offer
of the fund. According to the European Court, this too constituted a viola-
tion of Article 6 ECHR. At the moment when F.E. continued his action before
the normal courts he was entitled to rely on the fact that the law permitted
this. The fact that the Paris Court of Appeal had evidently interpreted the
Act more narrowly in the Bellet case was of no concern to F.E.
Like Mr. Bellet, F.E. could therefore reasonably believe that it was possible to pursue an
action in the civil courts concurrently with his compensation claim to the Fund, even
after he had accepted the Fund's offer. In view of the applicant's Situation at that time, he
cannot be criticised for not refusing a solution which met his most urgent needs, since he
was entitled to think that it had not been intended that, in the event of an offer being
accepted, the Act should deprive victims of the right to bring proceedings against any
liable party.
In view of this case law we consider that caution is needed in respect of a
limitation fund. The greater the discrepancy between the amount to which
the victim believes - with a certain degree of justification - he is entitled and
the amount which he can count on receiving through the fund, the greater
the need for the inclusion of an opt-out clause. Again, if a compensation
32 ECrtHR 4 December 1995 (Bellet/France), Series A vol. 333-B, § 37.
33 ECrtHR 30 October 1998 (F.E./France), K/&D 1998-VHI, no. 92, p. 3332, § 47.
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fund is to be certain of passing the test of the ECHR an opt-out clause is
essential.
We would point out that other fundamental rights too may play a role in
relation to the establishment of a fund. For example, the making of a
distinction between different victims or groups of victims without any
proper ground for such a distinction may be in breach of the principle of
equality in Article 14 ECHR and of Article 26 of the International Covenant
on Civü and Political Rights. In addition, the way in which compensation is
fixed may in itself be in breach of the requirement of a fair hearing under
Article 6 ECHR. The Dutch author Dommering-van Rongen writes:
It would be advisable when instituting a fund to incorporate a procedure for testing in
advance whether the limitations are reasonable and based on sound grounds. In the case
of mandatory funds this could make it possible to determine the equality of the claim
(i.e. the cjuid pro quo ). In the case of a fund with an opt-out clause the purpose of such a
test would be to ensure that the fund is widely accepted.34
She refers to the American practice of holding hearings at which all
interested parties or their representatives or organisations can make known
their position. The exercise of due care in the establishment of the scheme is
therefore of great importance. But doubts may always continue to exist, for
example about how and to what extent the designers of a fund should take
account oifuture Claims otfuture victims.
4.3 Limitation of liability and prescription
Forms of statutory limitation of the duty of a liable party to pay com-
pensation also constitute a violation of the principle of füll compensation.
Limitation of liability does not in itself appear to pose a problem. Limitation
serves the public interest in so far äs it means that certain activities of use to
society, such äs transport and energy generation, are insurable and hence
practicable. The limitations on liability are imposed in numerous sectors of
social life. Limitation is generally regarded äs necessary, for example in
transport and also in the event of large-scale disasters such äs an accident in
a nuclear power Station. However, the legislature must always make clear
why a limitation is necessary in a given case and why an exception to the
principle of füll compensation is made in respect of a given group of victims.
Furthermore, the amount of the limit must be supported by good
arguments.
The same applies to the imposition of Statutes of limitations. The public
interest is in this case that in a modern society law must adapt to the acrual
34 Dommering-van Rongen 1996, supra nole 31, p. 30.
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Situation after the passage of time. Anyone who remains inactive for too
long loses his right. This is in the interests of legal certainty. In the case of a
test by reference to the ECHR, much naturally depends on the circumstances
of the case: is a specific period of prescription not too short or too strictly
formulated? For the application of a test of this kind in the context of Article
6 ECHR see Stubbings and Öfters.35
Special attention should be paid to the Situation in which, for example,
the conditions for the commencement of a period of prescription change or
in which the length of the periods is reduced. The Dutch legislature
considered this issue when a completely new Civil Code was introduced in
1992, at which point the periods of prescription were reduced. In certain
cases by no less than 25 years (from 30 to 5 years)! A transitional rule was
introduced in order to prevent victims from losing their Claims in an unduly
brusque manner. Section 73 of the New Civil Code Overgangswet [Tran-
sitional Act] stipulated that if the new Civil Code provides for a period of
prescription of one year or longer and the period of prescription started to
run before the introduction of the new law on l January 1992 the rules of the
1992 Civil Code concerning the commencement, duration and nature of the
period do not apply for one year after the introduction of the new law. The
prescription is also deemed not to have been completed before the end of
that year.
This means in concrete terms that the old periods of prescription
remained applicable until l January 1993. After this 'postponement' year the
new shorter period took effect without exception. The consequences can be
far-reaching. Suppose that A is entitled to compensation from B for tort. The
period of prescription started to run before l January 1988. At that time the
claim would be barred by prescription only after 30 years. As a consequence
of the introduction of the 1992 Civil Code the period has been reduced to
five years. During the 1992 transitional year the creditor had to Interrupt the
prescription by instituting a legal action. If A did not do so, he saw his right
go up in smoke on l January 1993 äs a result of the completion of the new
period.
The question is therefore whether the transitional scheme was sufficient.
Was the transitional period of one year not too short? Was one entitled to
expect the State to mount a large-scale Information campaign? As it turned
35 ECrtHR 22 October 1996 (Stubbings and others/UK), RJ&D 1996-IV, no. 17, p. 1487, § 50-57.
This case concerned a number of women who had been sexually abused in their childhood.
Under the prevailing rules their claim to compensation was barred six years after their 18th
birthday. The applicants submitted that it was only at a later age that they discovered the
connection between certain complaints and the events in their childhood. The European
Court held that the periods of prescription were not contrary to Article 6 ECHR.
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out, the Information was provided mainly by associations of patients acting
on their own initiative.
We are critical of another matter in particular. There is a debate in the
Netherlands äs to whether, say, an asbestosis victim can lose his claim to
compensation without becoming aware of his disorder. The incubation time
of asbestosis is between 20 and 40 years. The applicable period of pre-
scription was 20 years (it is now been extended to 30 years). In this way, a
right to compensation may be barred without the person entitled ever being
aware of the damage. Is this right? The views on this are divided. Various
ways are suggested in the literature of avoiding this rather unsatisfactory
result.36
In our view this debate can very well be placed in a human rights
perspective: is a Situation in which a personal injury victim is unable to
Institute his claim because it is barred before he becomes aware of the
damage (and perhaps comparable cases of victims in general) compatible
with the Protocol? And is the national legislature not subject to an Obligation
to make statutory provision for compensation for these victims? In our view,
this is the case. It should, incidentally, be noted that in 1998 the courts took
an important step towards helping the victims. The case involved sexual
abuse in which the victim was so badly affected that she was unable to
Institute a claim for compensation before the expiry of the period of
prescription. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that in so far äs
application of the law could result in the barring of a claim which the victim
was unable to enforce this is hard to accept in terms of individual justice.
This applies in particular if the inability to enforce the claim results from
circumstances attributable to the perpetrator. According to the Supreme
Court, the period of prescription Starts to run in such a case only when these
circumstances no longer prevent the institution of the claim.37
The Dutch legislature also now seems to be aware of the problems of
victims who unwittingly lose their right of action. The State Secretary for
Social Affairs and Employment has introduced an amendment to the
legislation in connection with the problems faced by the victims of
asbestosis. The amendment is intended to cover situations in which an
injury remains concealed for so long that the right of action has already been
barred by prescription before it comes to light. Under the new prescription
rules a claim for compensation for personal injury will not be barred by
prescription äs long äs the injured party is unaware of his injury and
36 See for example }. Spier, Schade en loss occurrence verzekeringen, Deventer: Kluwer 1998,
chapter 5.
37 HR 23 October 1998, N/ 2000,15 (M/B) and HR 25 June 1999, N/ 2000,16 (B/B).
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unaware of who is responsible for it. From the moment at which he becomes
aware or could reasonably expected to have been aware of these facts he has
a period of five years in which to Institute a claim. If he allows this period to
expire, the claim is barred after all. Under the Bill the law in respect of
damage other than personal injury will remain unchanged; the new rules
will also apply only to events that cause damage in the future.38
5 CONCLUSION
The protection of possessions under human rights law is not confined to the
technical concept of ownership under national law. It extends to the entire
area covered by private law entitlement ('property' within the meaning of
Section 6 Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code).
Despite this wide scope, we believe that Article l Protocol No. l ECHR
will continue to play a relatively limited role in civil law in the future.
Where cases involve the determination of rights between individuals Article
l provides no criterion whatever. However, the Article does play a role in its
classical function: provision of protection against a State which passes
legislation either depriving him of claims under private law against other
citizens or the State itself or limiting him in the exercise of these rights.
Γη this connection we have examined the law of compensation, and in
particular the mandatory participation in compensation funds, statutory
limitation of liability, and prescription. In our view, these three examples
can in principle pass the test of the Protocol. We say 'in principle' because
although the European Court allows the national courts and legislature a
substantial margin of appreciation there are certainly limits.
The legislature should be aware of these limits. For example, the
inclusion of an opt-out clause for injured parties seems necessary when
establishing a compensation fund. Did the authorities take adequate action
when the periods of prescription were shortened by the introduction of the
new Civil Code in 1992? Although the year's 'postponement' provided by
the transitional rules smoothed away the sharp edges of the reduction of the
periods of prescription, one may well wonder whether this was sufficient
for all cases. And did not the authorities have the duty to provide
information on this point in order to draw the attention of individuals to the
disappearance of their rights, thereby enabling them to take action in good
time to Interrupt the prescription? Allowing a Situation to exist or continue
to exist in which the right to compensation may be barred by prescription
before the victim has even realised he has such a right seems to us suspect.
38 Letter to the Lower House of Parlament, Kamerstukken II, 1998-1999,25834, no. 7.
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Provision to cover this appears to have been made in the Netherlands both
by the courts and by the legislature. Whether this is sufficient remains to be
seen: the new legislation mentioned in this Article applies only to future
victims.
Taking everything into account the proportionality requirement which
underlies Article l äs a whole is of great importance. This brings us to what
we consider to be the most important conclusion which we can draw for our
area of law. Even where cases involve rights arising from relationships
under civil law and where one might initially consider that the role of
human rights is limited (or even entirely absent) the national legislahire
must constantly consider whether a given measure is consistent with Article
l Protocol No. 1. It will in particular have to consider whether the require-
ment of 'proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realised' has been satisfied. Evasion of this issue is unwise and will
inevitably lead to endless debate, with the attendant risk that this debate can
only be resolved in Strasbourg.
POSTSCRIPT
Shortly after the completion of this contribution the Dutch Supreme Court
delivered an important judgment. It concerned a case of asbestos. An em-
ployee of a shipyard where asbestos had been used in the 1950s and 1960s
learned over 30 years after his exposure to the substance that he was
suffering from the fatal illness mesothelioma. The Court of Appeal had held
on appeal that the right of action had been barred by prescription for this
reason. The problem was described above in section 4.3.
The Supreme Court was more favourably disposed towards the victim
than the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held first and foremost that a
period of prescription of 30 years should in principle be strictly applied in
the case of injury caused by asbestos. Nonetheless, it directed that in
"exceptional cases" an exception could be made to this rule. This would
apply in particular to cases where the victim had been completely unable to
lodge a claim for compensation: before the expiry of the period of pre-
scription because no damage yet existed or was yet known and after the
expiry of the period because the right of action was barred by prescription.
According to the Supreme Court, this would mean in fact the statutory
prescription arrangement would not so much nullify an existing right of
action but prevent even the creation of a right of action.
The Supreme Court managed to base this exception, which is not in fact
provided for in the Civil Code (the period of 30 years is a hard-and-fast
period), on a different general provision in the Code in which it is stated that
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a binding rule does not apply between a creditor (victim) and debtor
(tortfeasor) to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be
"unacceptable according to criteria of reasonableness and equity" (Section
6:2 Civil Code).
In explaining the reasonableness of this exception, the Supreme Court
referred to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Court held that in the Stubbings case the premise had been that a right of
action is not absolute but may be subject to limitations. To this extent the
Contracting States have a margin of appreciation, äs long äs the limitations
do not go so far äs to impair 'the very essence of the right'. In the case before
it, the Supreme Court stated that given the length of the period (30 years is
very long by present Standards) and the aim of legal certainty which
prescription is intended to serve, it could not be said that this limitation of
access to the courts feil outside the margin of appreciation. Nonetheless, it
held that the exception formulated above to the hard-and-fast period of 30
years, based on the dictates of reasonableness and equity, was in keeping
with the right of access to the courts äs laid down in Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (Supreme Court, 28 April 2000).
In his opinion to the Supreme Court, Advocate General Spier pointed
out that mesothelioma victims would be affected in the very essence of their
right if the period of prescription were to have expired before the sickness
came to light.
If one compares this judgment (which, by its very nature, also has
retroactive effect) with section 4.3 of the article in the Bill (which applies
only to future cases), one is bound to conclude that the human rights
problem involved in prescription has to a large extent been resolved in
Dutch law.
